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California trial courts have developed a pattern of class action
adjudication which closely mirrors the pragmatic approach of federal
practice under amended Rule 23' of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
1. "(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a prac-
tical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudi-
cations or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applica-
ble to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect -to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgment;
Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class ac-
tion, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances. . ..
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
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dure.2 This similarity has evolved through an increasingly liberalized
interpretation of California's general class action statute, section 382 of
the Code of Civil Procedure,3 and as a result of language closely
analogous to Rule 23 in section 17814 of the Civil Code, which em-
bodies the class action provisions of the recently passed Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA) .1
Critical to the development of this pragmatic approach has been
the California Supreme Court's application of Rule 23 to state proceed-
subclass treated as a class ....
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,
the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or
prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the repre-
sentative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elim-
inate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters ....
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.
2. See Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1041, 1059
(1971).
3. "[Alnd when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all be-
fore the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." CAL. CODE Civ.
Pxoc. § 382 (West 1973).
4. "(b) The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all mem-
bers of the represented class if all the following conditions exist:
(I) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court.
(2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and pre-
dominate over the questions affecting the individual members.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class.
(4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(c) If notice of the time and place of the hearing is served upon the other parties at
least 10 days prior thereto, the court shall hold a hearing, upon motion of any party
to the action which is supported by affidavit of any person or persons having knowledge
of the facts, to determine if any of the following apply to the action:
(1) A class action pursuant to subdivision (b) is proper.
(2) Published notice pursuant to subdivision (d) is necessary to adjudicate the claims
of the class.
(3) The action is without merit or there is no defense to the action." CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1781 (West 1973).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West 1973).
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ings. In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,6 the court first noted the substantial
similarity between the criteria prescribed by Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)
and its construction of section 382 with regard to the prerequisites for a
maintainable class suit.1 With reference to possible inadequacies in the
specific provisions enumerated in section 1781 for bringing a class
action under the CLRA, the court in Vasquez v. Superior -Courts
pointed out that Rule 23 prescribes procedural devices which a trial
court might find useful in the absence of clear state direction. Specifical-
ly, it noted that Rule 23(c)(1) provides that the trial court's initial
determination of class maintainability may be conditional and may be
altered or amended before a decision on the merits, and that these
options give the trial court added flexibility.' In LaSala v. American
Savings & Loan Association,'0 the court cited Rule 23(e), which re-
quires notification of class members in the event of a proposed dismissal,
and remarked that California observes a similar rule with regard to
dismissals of consumer class actions and stockholders' suits." The prin-
ciple emerging from these cases is that California trial courts are to use
the class action procedures of the federal rule in the absence of control-
ling California authority.' 2
In City of San Jose v. Superior Court,'3 decided in late 1974, the
court added yet another federal ingredient to the procedure governing
class actions in California. Disposing of the defendant's contention that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to certify the class for lack of a proper
motion,' 4 the court noted that it has urged trial courts to be procedurally
innovative and to incorporate procedures from outside sources in deter-
mining whether to allow the maintenance of a class suit. 15 In particular,
6. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
7. Id. at 709, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734. In Daar, the court estab-
lished the classic two-prong test of a maintainable class suit: 1) an ascertainable class,
and 2) a well-defined community of interest in questions of law and fact. Id. at 704,
433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
8. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
9. Id. at 821, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
10. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
11. Id. at 872, 489 P.2d at 1117, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
12. See generally 3 B. WrraN, CALInORN PROCEDURE Pleading § 178C (2d ed.
1971, Supp. 1975).
13. 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974).
14. The trial court in City of San Jose had certified the class on the defendant's
motion for a determination that the class was not appropriate. The defendant contended
that as a result, the court was without jurisdiction to determine that the class was appro-
priate. The court noted that under Rule 23(c)(1), the determination may be made on
the motion of either the plaintiff or the defendant, or on the motion of the court. Id.
at 453-54, 525 P.2d at 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 801; accord, Johnson v. City of Baton
Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 298 (E.D. La. 1970).
15. 12 Cal. 3d at 453, 525 P.2d at 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
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the court noted its approval of the first sentence of Rule 23(c)(1)
which provides: "As soon as practicable after commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained."' 6
Now that the court has expressly incorporated the class certifica-
tion provision of Rule 23 (c) (1) into California procedure, the question
becomes one of determining what the rule means. Specifically, what is
meant by "as soon as practicable?" What duty does it impose and what
discretion does it leave with the trial court in determining the main-
tainability of a class suit? It is the purpose of this note to examine how
the federal courts have construed Rule 23 (c) (1), to analyze the prac-
tical aspects and underlying policy issues of the class determination, and
to suggest a method of procedure for California trial courts in light
of this most recent supreme court directive.
Construction of Rule 23(c)(1) in the Federal Courts
Subdivision (c)(1) of revised Rule 23 had no counterpart in the
original rule. 7 Its inclusion was part of an overall attempt in 1966 to
make Rule 23 a practical tool for the adjudication of class actions and to
provide measures which would assure procedural fairness. 8 In the
words of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the purpose of the (c)(1) determina-
tion is to give clear definition to the class action.' 9
Rule 23(c)(1) directs that in every case brought as a class action,
the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
This determination depends on a finding that the action satisfies the four
prerequisites for a class action stated in subdivison (a) of Rule 23 and
that it meets the requirements for at least one of the three types of class
suits provided for by subdivision (b).2 ' If one or more of the require-
ments of subdivision (a) are not met, or the action fails to satisfy one of
the class types specified in subdivision (b), the court must rule that the
action is not maintainable as a class action.22 The suit is then stripped of
16. Id.
17. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.50 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CIVIL § 1785,
at 128 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
18. See generally MOORE, supra note 17, 1 23.01, at 23-15 to -24.
19. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States Dis-
trict Courts, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 73, 104 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Advisory Committee's Note].
20. See note 1 supra.
21. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104; see Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); City of Philadelphia
v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
22. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 132.
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its class characteristics. On the other hand, if an affirmative determina-
tion is made, the action is to be viewed as having been a class action
from the date of its commencement rather than from the determination
date. 3 The maintainability decision must be implemented by an order
under Rule 23(d)(4).24 Alternatively, the court may decide that a
partial class action is appropriate.25 Even when the court concludes that
no portion is maintainable as a class action, the plaintiffs may continue
the litigation on an individual basis, and nonparty members may join or
intervene.
26
The trial court must carefully apply the criteria set forth in Rule 23
to the facts of the case, and if it fails to do so its determination is subject
to reversal on appeal.27 Nevertheless, within the general framework of
Rule 23, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to
allow maintenance of the suit as a class action. 2s As one commentator
has remarked:
[The] complete overhaul of rule 23 significantly expands the scope
of class actions. . . . [The district judge, unhampered by tra-
ditional classifications [true, hybrid, spurious], 29 is given a large
measure of discretion in balancing conflicting interests. 30
Either a plaintiff or a defendant may move for the (c)(1)
determination. Absent prejudice to the class or the opposing party, mere
delay in seeking an affirmative decision under the rule is not a sufficient
basis for denying the motion.3 Alternatively, the court may make the
23. MooRE, supra note 17, 23.50, at 23-1103 to -1104.
24. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 132-33.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
26. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 132.
27. MOORE, supra note 17, 123.50, at 23-1104 to -1105.
28. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972); City of New
York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1969); Moonn,
supra note 17, 23.50, at 23-1105; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 134-35.
29. The three categories of class actions under the original rule were defined ac-
cording to the abstract rights involved: "true" class actions were those involving joint
or common rights; "hybrid" actions involved several rights related to specific property;
and "spurious" actions involved several rights affected by a common question and related
to common relief. This classification proved unworkable because it failed to provide
adequate guidance with regard to the composition of each class type, the proper extent
of a judgment, and the means of assuring procedural fairness. For these reasons it was
discarded in favor of the more pragmatic approach of the amended rule. Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, supra note 19, at 98-99.
30. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. LJ. 1204, 1214
(1966).
31. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Feder v. Harrington,
52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Adise v. Mather, 56 F.R.D. 492 (D. Colo.
1972) (untimely motion denied); Taub v. Glickman, 14 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 847, 848-
49 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (class allegations dismissed when motion was made three years
after suit commenced); Herbst v. Able, 45 F.R.D. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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determination on its own motion. 2 This power has been held to impose
an independent obligation on the trial court.3 Noting the "vital area of
uncertainty or paralysis" that exists until the court decides whether a
suit is to be deemed a class action, Judge Marvin E. Frankel, United
States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, concludes
that it may not be acceptable to leave control over the timing of the
(c)(1) determination with the parties. 4 In any event, during the
period between the filing of the class complaint and the (c)(1) de-
termination, the action must be assumed to be a class suit for purposes
of court approved compromise or dismissal under Rule 23(e).35
Rule 23(c) (1) requires the trial court to make its determination
"as soon as practicable."36 From this language has evolved a major
controversy over the (c)(1) determination. Does the rule mandate the
earliest possible determination? Under what circumstances, if any, is a
delayed determination permissible? Given the general language of the
rule and the broad discretion vested in the trial court, a definitive
interpretation of this provision is impossible absent a specific court
rule.37 As Judge Frankel explains:
The key word here-"practicable" -is characteristic of the Rule.
It does not purport to supply a precise mold for all the endless
variety of cases. It calls upon the judges to judge-to weigh the
particular circumstances of particular cases and decide concretely
what will work, and how to work, in the individual situations as
they appear.
38
32. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Frankel].
33. See, e.g., Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 260 n.1 (D. Del. 1968);
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 128.
34. Frankel, supra note 32, at 41. In light of his conclusion, Judge Frankel sug-
gests that it may be necessary to provide by local rule that there be a motion at some
relatively early stage for at least a preliminary ruling under Rule 23(c) (1). The Los
Angeles Superior Court has been a leader in promulgating such local rules. See Los
ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, MANUAL FOR THE CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON CLASS
ACTiON ISSUES (April 3, 1973) [hereinafter cited as CLASS ACTION MANUAL]. See also
McGough & Lerach, Termination of Clas Actions: The Judicial Role, 33 U. Prrt. L.
REv. 445 (1972).
35. See, e.g., City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th
Cir. 1971); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
36. Professor Wright notes that while this requirement applies to any Rule 23 class
action, it is especially important with a (b) (3) action due to its particular notice require-
ments. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 181-82 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Wright].
37. The Southern District Court for New York has adopted Civil Rule I A(c)
which provides that the party asserting a claim for or against a class shall move for
the (c)(1) determination within 60 days after filing of the pleadings. See Wolfson v.
Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. Frankel, supra note 32, at 40.
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Judge Frankel concludes that the time when a firm class determination
is practicable will vary from case to case. In the initial stages of
litigation, it may be possible only to formulate a program of discovery
under as stringent a timetable as circumstances will allow; in such a case
the (c)(1) determination must be scheduled subsequently.3 9
Recent cases demonstrate that the (c) (1) determination is not sus-
ceptible of a concrete time frame. In some instances the determination
has been delayed because of an inability to determine whether class ac-
tion treatment is appropriate. Such inability may be caused by a collater-
al dispute over jurisdiction,40 or because of defendant's refusal to partici-
pate in discovery,41 or by the need to convene a three-judge court.42 The
determination may also be delayed because of other pending proceed-
ings. In one case there was a two-year delay waiting for judgment on
a pending action which concerned substantially the same facts.43
In other cases the courts have decided the maintainability issue at
an early stage. In one case," for example, the named plaintiff had no
personal knowledge of defendant's contested hiring policies during the
two years preceding the suit, and the court readily denied class certifica-
tion for lack of fair and adequate representation as required by Rule
23(a)(4). In another case,45 the purported class was too indefinite to
be amenable to class treatment, and the court again made a summary
ruling against maintainability.
A substantial number of courts have expressly called for an early
determination as their general rule. In Berman v. Narragansett Racing
Association, Inc.,48 for example, the court stated that the determination
should be made "at the earliest pragmatically wise moment." 47 The
court in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.
48
noted that "Rule 23(c)(1) contemplates a prompt determination after
39. Id. at 41-42. Judge Frankel at least impliedly seems -to advocate an early de-
termination in his discussion of notice to the class, in which he states that if it is to
be effective, "the invitation must go out as promptly as circumstances will permit." Id.
at 41. Again, in his discussion of timing of the determination, he notes that the serious
consequences attending class allegations require early intervention and suitable protective
measures. Id. at 42.
40. See, e.g., City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir.
1971).
41. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
42. See, e.g., Moldenhauer v. Provo, 326 F. Supp. 480 (D. 'Minn. 1970).
43. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242 (D. Conn. 1970).
45. Reinisch v. New York Stock Exch., 52 F.R.D. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.L 1969).
47. Id. at 336. But see Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
48. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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the filing of the action." 9 Denying plaintiff's motion for additional
pretrial discovery prior to the class determination, the court in Berland
v. Mack5" said, "Further delay for the purpose of engaging in a scalpel-
fine definition of the class would run counter to the mandate of Rule
23(c)(1) . . . 51
Given that the (c)(1) determination was designed merely to be a
threshold measure to give clear definition to the action,5" it seems that
absent some compelling reason, such as the refusal of a party to partici-
pate in discovery or the pendency of a closely related action, early
determination should prevail as a general rule. Moreover, when a case is
doubtful, the court in Esplin v. Hirschi53 instructs:
[I]f there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not against
the maintenance of the class action, for it is always subject to modi-
fication should later developments during the course of the trial
so require.5 4
The courts have not always followed this admonition. Left to their
resources, they have indulged in a good deal of judicial rulemaking.
The result has been a line of cases in which the threshold (c)(1)
determination has evolved into a mini-trial on the merits. It is this
development and its attendant conflicts that are next to be examined.
Preliminary Hearings: From Dolgow to Eisen
At the core of the controversy concerning the timing of the (c)(1)
determination is the question of the propriety of a preliminary hearing at
which plaintiff must prove a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits. 15 The implementation of such a hearing necessarily will forestall
a decision on class action maintainability.
The leading case on preliminary hearings is Dolgow v. Anderson. 6
On cross motions to determine maintainability, the court in Dolgow
49. Id. at 326; accord, Sperberg v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 61 F.R.D. 70
(N.D. Ohio 1973); see Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
50. 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
51. Id. at 126.
52. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
53. 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
54. Id. at 99. See text accompanying notes 111-16 infra.
55. See Note, A (c)(1) Hearing on Maintainability of a Class Action Suit Should
Not Determine Ultimate Merits of Individual Claim, 11 HousT. L. REV. 732 (1974).
The conflict over the preliminary hearing in the federal decisions is reflected in Cali-
fornia case law. Compare Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 193, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1974) with Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33
Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973)."56. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion supporting preliminary
hearings in the context of (b) (3) actions see Comment, Making the Class Determina-
tion in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 791 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Class Determination].
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ordered an evidentiary hearing at which the plaintiffs would be required
to show that there was a substantial possibility that they would prevail
on the merits.
57
Although a number of courts followed Dolgow,58 disapproval of
the preliminary hearing device was forthcoming. The court in Mersay v.
First Republic Corp. of America,59 decided three weeks after Dolgow,
flatly rejected the propriety of a preliminary hearing on the merits.
Requiring plaintiff to prove a substantial likelihood of success would
mean that no class action could stand until the plaintiff proved every
material element of his individual claim. "Clearly," said the court, "such
a procedure was not envisioned under Rule 23."11 The court continued:
[S]uch a hearing would be a fact-finding procedure that would de-
prive the plaintiff and the class of the right to a jury trial. It would
turn Rule 23 into a cumbersome procedure. I cannot conceive
that the drafters of the rule intended necessarily extensive hear-
ings to determine facts which may be ultimate to the litigation. 6 .
The reasoning employed by the court in Mersay was adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Miller v. Mackey International, Inc.6" "In determining
the propriety of a class action," the court said, "the question is not
whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will prevail on the
merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met." 63 As to
57. The court said: "A case such as the present one should not be allowed to pro-
ceed as a class action unless the plaintiffs are able to convince the Court that there is
a substantial possibility that they will prevail on the merits .... In this case, an evi-
dentiary hearing at which the plaintiffs will be required to make such a preliminary
showing should be held before the class action motion is decided." 43 F.R.D. at 501.
The court in Dolgow grounded its authority for ordering such a preliminary hear-
ing on Rule 23(d), which permits the court to make orders determining the course of
the proceeding. Id. But see Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971);
Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Mersay v. First Republic
Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court analogized the maintain-
ability hearing to the requirement of a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction
at which the court considers the likelihood that one party or the other will prevail at
trial. 43 F.R.D. at 502. It also saw the hearing as having an effect similar to that
of an order allowing a class action to proceed conditionally pending further discovery.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ap-
peal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47
F.R.D. -60 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
59. 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. Id. at 469; accord, Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Feder v.
Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n,
Inc., 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969).
61. 43 F.R.D. at 469. Under the Mersay approach, the plaintiff's burden is
limited to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). This approach is in har-
mony with the drafters' intent. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104.
62. 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. Id. at 427. The court stressed that in spite of language in Rule 23 which may
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defendant's contention that the grave consequences attendant upon ap-
proval of a class action warranted prior judicial assessment of the
likelihood of success on the merits,64 the court said it could not "rewrite
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seriously undermine the class
action device in order to avoid dubious harm to. . .defendants." 65 The
court pointed out that purely vexatious litigation could be attacked by a
Rule 12 motion for dismissal or a Rule 56 motion for summary judg-
ment, the established procedures for halting claims that fail to state
grounds on which relief can be granted.66 Moreover, the court said, the
specific requirements enumerated in Rule 23 are difficult to meet and
represent additional obstacles to a frivolous suit.
67
The United States Supreme Court finally responded to the debate
over the propriety of preliminary hearings in its recent decision in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.6" A brief overview of this complex case is
necessary to understand the Supreme Court's holding. The initial Eisen
decision by the district court held that the suit was not maintainable as
a class action.69 Appeal resulted in two decisions known popularly as
Eisen P0 and Eisen 11.71 In Eisen I the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the district court's decision against maintainability was
a final order for purposes of appeal. Eisen II reversed the district court's
dismissal of the class action. On remand, the district court ruled in
three successive opinions that 1) further information was required prior
to a class determination, 72 2) the action was maintainable as a class ac-
tion, but a preliminary hearing would be held prior to assessing the cost
of notice and determining who would pay,7 3 and 3) defendants would
be required to bear 90 percent of the cost of notice. 74  Once again the
case was appealed. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
certification of the class in a decision known popularly as Eisen IH,7
and certiorari was granted.76
appear to confer broad power, the Advisory Committee's Note makes clear that a district
judge is to consider only the specific requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). Id. at 428.
64. Defendant's chief concern was that sending out notice would cause it financial
injury because shareholders might interpret such notice to be the court's tacit approval
of the suit. Id. at 428.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 428-29; accord, Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
67. 452 F.2d at 429.
68. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
69. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
70. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
71. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
73. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
75. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
76. 414U.S. 908 (1973).
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Relevant to the instant problem was the district court's decision to
order a hearing on the issue of notice subsequent to certifying the class
on remand. This hearing was apparently intended to be a Dolgow-type
mini-trial on the merits. The court of appeals expressly overruled the
availability of this procedure in Eisen III.77 The court noted that the
federal rules provide many procedural devices for the disposition of
cases on the merits, but that
neither in amended Rule 23 nor in any other rule [is there] provi-
sion for any tentative, provisional or other makeshift determina-
tion of the issues of any case on the merits for the avowed purpose
of deciding a collateral matter such as [giving notice]. In most
cases [such a procedure] without the salutary safeguards appli-
cable to all full scale trials on the merits will be extremely prejudi-
cial to one or the other of the parties [and] may well be irre-
parable. 78
Accordingly, the court held that the entire preliminary hearing on the
merits was conducted without jurisdiction. 9
The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's ruling on the
impropriety of the preliminary hearing device.s0 This holding should
effectively overrule Dolgow and the cases following it. The Court ex-
pressly disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Rule 23 as
authority for preliminary hearings, noting that there was "nothing in
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."''8 Pointing
out that such a procedure is directly contrary to the command of Rule
23(c)(1), the Court squarely approved the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Miller v. Mackey International, Inc.s2 that the question in a class
determination is not whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action or will
prevail on -the merits, but whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.
83
In addition, the Court noted that a preliminary determination of the
merits might prove particularly prejudicial to the defendant by coloring
the subsequent proceedings and imposing unfair burdens on him in the
absence of established safeguards applicable to civil trials.8 4
If the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Eisen is that it abrogates Dolgow, the issue over the use of the prelimi-
nary hearing as a mini-trial on the merits should finally be laid to rest.
77. 479 F.2d 1005, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
78. Id. at 1015.
79. Id. at 1016.
80. 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
81. Id.
82. 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
83. 417 U.S. at 178.
84. Id.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court's ruling against these preliminary hearings is
in harmony with the position of a growing number of Circuits, including
the First,85 Second, 6 Fifth,8 7 Ninth,88 and Tenth.89 Clearly, this seems
to be the preferred view. As Professors Wright and Miller conclude:
On balance, foregoing an evidentiary hearing except in exceptional
cases represents the better resolution of this conflict inasmuch as
the Rule 23(c) (1) decision can be rendered in most cases without
harassing expense and publicity adverse to defendant. 90
Practical Aspects and Underlying Policies of the
(c) (1) Determination
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has taken a position
against preliminary hearings on the merits by no means settles the
general issue of when the class determination is to be made. On the
contrary, it merely rules out one potentially dilatory tactic. There is still
substantial opportunity for delay, sometimes- for good reason, and the
uncertainty concerning the appropriate timing of the (c) (1) determina-
tion continues to plague both litigants and courts.
A brief sketch of the procedural aspects of the class determination
and their attendant policy issues is instructive at this point. Generally
speaking, the class determination is the next step after making the initial
litigation decision, selecting the named plaintiffs, and filing the plead-
ings. The court conducts a class action hearing to determine whether the
suit is maintainable as a class action. It has been suggested that main-
tainability can be determined by the pleadings and affidavits.9 More
typically, limited discovery is conducted on the class issues, and the
products of this discovery lay the foundation for the court's determina-
tion.92 Whichever procedure is followed, the class action hearing is an
evidentiary hearing. Whether this hearing is within the ambit of Rule 23
depends on its scope. An evidentiary hearing at which the class issues
are argued is permissible;93 under Eisen, a preliminary hearing at which
85. See Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972).
86, See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417
U.S. 156 (1974).
87. See Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. See City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971);
Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
89. See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969).
90. WRIGHT & MrLLER, supra note 17, § 1785, at 136.
91. See Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
92. See Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
93. See City of San Jose v. Superior Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1974).
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the plaintiff is required to show a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits is not.94
As a practical matter, a defendant typically seeks to delay the class
determination in the hope of improving his position. A long delay, for
example, might cause the plaintiff to lose interest in prosecuting his ac-
tion. A defendant's most effective weapon for postponing the deter-
mination is detailed discovery, usually in the form of interrogatories,
on the class issues. Such discovery can relate to whether the claims of
the representative plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class, whether
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, or whether the
common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual
members.95 The plaintiff, on the other hand, normally seeks the earliest
determination possible. In this way, he hopes to maintain a vigorous
prosecution and achieve an advantage over his opponent. Moreover,
a class determination in the plaintiff's favor has substantial settlement
value.
Undoubtedly, there is a fine tension between what is permissible in
the preparation and conduct of the class action hearing and what is not.
At its core, whether "as soon as practicable" is to be read as directing
the court to an early determination, so as to invite a cursory examination
of the action, or a delayed determination, in order to accommodate more
extensive discovery, is a policy issue to be resolved between competing
interests.
In all but the simplest cases, some discovery prior to the class
hearing is necessary in order to give the litigants an opportunity to cull
those facts on which the court may make a reasoned decision. Use of a
fact finding procedure serves to discourage nuisance suits,96 to ferret out
insubstantial claims, 7 and to save expensive time for both the parties
and the court. Proponents of this tool see it as an expeditious means of
resolving the maintainability issue within an adversary context.9
The class hearing has collateral advantages as well. If the court
finds a claim to be without substance at the outset, the time and expense
of issuing notice is avoided.99 Likewise eliminated is the potentially
detrimental effect on a corporate defendant's reputation and stock which
might result as a consequence of adverse publicity.100
94. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
95. See FED. R. Cr. P. 23(a)-(b).
96. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
97. See Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dis-
missed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
98. See Class Determination, supra note 56, at 814-17.
99. See City & County of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 640 (D.
Colo. 1971).
100. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E:D.N.Y. 1968).
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In spite of these advantages, at some point the class hearing turns
into a mini-trial on the merits, regardless of its label. The more discov-
ery that is allowed, and the more facts that are introduced at the
hearing, the more the hearing takes on the character of a mini-trial.
Serious due process questions emerge. Most important, a negative deter-
mination resulting from such a pretrial of the issues is a denial of
plaintiff's right to a jury.1"' As the Supreme Court pointed out in Eisen,
a pretrial also deprives the defendant of the procedural safeguards
available at trial.102
There are additional problems with a prolonged class hearing.
First, the hearing in many instances will be merely duplicative of the
trial itself. 1 3 It thus imposes an additional burden on the litigants and
the court, and turns the (c)(1) determination into a cumbersome
procedure. 04 At least one court views these hearings as a luxury which
crowded court dockets cannot absorb.' 0 5 Second, the rigors of an evi-
dentiary hearing at the very threshold of a suit have the capacity for
discouraging a plaintiff's theretofore eager class.10 6 One writer points
out that the "ultimate effectiveness of the federal remedies . . .may
depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action de-
vice."'0 7 Therefore, such a device should not be unduly frustrated.
Third, to many courts this procedure is a modification, if not a misap-
plication, of the law on motions for dismissal and summary judgment
which is wholly unsupported by precedent.0 8
Finally, a prolonged class hearing raises serious implications with
regard to discovery. Discovery is a time consuming and costly proce-
dure. Allowing extensive discovery prior to a determination that the
class is maintainable, when in fact the ruling may be adverse to the class,
is wasteful from the standpoints of both time and cost. Moreover, once
the class is certified, the discovery effort can be consolidated and made
binding on all parties. The more expeditiously the class determination is
handled, the less likely it is to frustrate the economies discovery was
intended to achieve.
101. See Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D.
555 (N.D. l1l. 1972); Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
102. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
103. See Class Determination, supra note 56, at 816.
104. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
105. See Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
106. Id.
107. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1819 (2d ed. 1961).
108. See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971);
Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 563-64
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
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Certainly, the trial court faces a difficult task in deciding when to
make the (c)(1) determination. Inherent in the rule's pragmatic ap-
proach are shortcomings and potential abuses. That the rule calls for a
determination as soon as practicable does not give the moving party an
automatic right to an immediate determination in every case. Nor would
advocating such a position be prudent. As Professor Wright points out,
the rule suffers "from those who embrace it too enthusiastically"'01° by
encouraging class treatment of controversies that are in fact unmanagea-
ble.
On the other hand, using the class action hearing as a tactical
weapon to delay the prosecution of meritorious suits is equally unac-
ceptable. The trial court must carefully weigh the facts of each case
against the rule's command to make the determination as soon as
practicable when it frames the scope of both prehearing discovery and
the hearing itself. Particularly, it must guard against permitting the
hearing to evolve into a mini-trial on the merits.1 0
Conditional Orders
Admittedly, a court is somewhat handicapped by having to decide
the maintainability issue as soon as practicable. Absent the benefit of
full discovery, there is always the danger that the court will misjudge the
viability of the class. If the class determination were binding, the court
would naturally hesitate to issue its maintainability order at the requisite
early stage in the proceedings.
Rule 23(c)(1) offers the solution to this problem in its second
sentence, which provides that the maintainability order may be condi-
tional and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits."' This provision gives the trial court two options." 2 On the one
hand, the court may determine the class issue conditionally.113 For
109. Wright, supra note 36, at 171.
110. An excellent example of a court taking a pragmatic approach to the resolution
of the maintainability issue is found in Grad v. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). There the court noted some of the practical inefficiencies created by the
rule, such as chance litigation of unmeritorious suits, strike suits and coercive settle-
ments, and huge recoveries often divided disproportionately between class members and
their counsel. Id. at 94. Nevertheless, the court .concluded, "[t]he answer to these
problems . . . is not to abandon Rule 23 where the stakes are high . . . but rather to
be more selective in its usage and application." Id.
111. See note I supra.
112. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104; WIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 17, § 1785, at 138.
113. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104. The form of the condi-
tional determination is illustrated in Hardy v. United States Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp.
200, 203 (N.D. Ala. 1967), ip which the court ordered: "Mhis action is to be main-
tained as a class action; upofi condition, however, that the plaintiffs shall file on or be-
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example, the court might make its order conditional on improvement in
representation,1 14 in order to ensure compliance with the requirement
embodied in subdivision (a)(4) that the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Alternatively, the
court may make the determination free of any conditions and subse-
quently alter or amend it if, upon fuller development of the facts, the
original determination appears unsound." 5 While some courts have
expressly provided for this contingency in their orders, 1 6 such specifica-
tion would seem unnecessary, as the rule itself makes the determination
tentative in nature.
The tentative determination was early construed in Kronenberg v.
Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.117 as a complement to the first sentence of
Rule 23(c)(1), which requires the determination to be made as soon as
practicable after commencement of the action. To the court in Kronen-
berg, the tentative determination provided an important tool which
made more feasible the requirement of an early determination by allow-
ing the determination, once made, to be altered or amended if it became
necessary at a later stage. The court noted that while the class action
before it might have required dismissal under the old rule, amended
Rule 23 provided the flexibility to permit the action to proceed.' 18 If
fore October 1, 1967, an amendment to their complaint defining clearly and with partic-
ularity the class which plaintiffs seek to represent in this action, in accordance with the
foregoing opinion; and upon the further condition that plaintiffs file with the Clerk of
this Court, in writing, the names and addresses of all members of such class, to the best
of their knowledge, information and belief."
114. This condition was contemplated by the Advisory Committee. See Advisory
Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104. Eisen H established the classic three-prong
test of what constitutes fair and adeqate representation: 1) a qualified and experienced
attorney; 2) a representative party capable of vigorously and diligently prosecuting the
action; and 3) lack of antagonistic interests between the class representative and mem-
bers. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968). Under
these criteria the court might condition its order on the substitution or addition of named
plaintiffs who, in the court's eyes, would be more capable of vigorously prosecuting the
action. Presumably, failure to make the necessary substitutions or additions would cause
the class to fail.
Requiring improvement in representation is a condition consistent with Rule 23.
Some courts have imposed conditions not related to Rule 23. See, e.g., Milberg v. West-
ern Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Other courts, how-
ever, have suggested the impropriety of this procedure. See, e.g., Miller v. Mackey Int'l,
Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971), Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental
Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See generally Note, Conditional Deter-
mination, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038 (1974).
115. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104; Wright, supra note 36, at
182.
116. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
See generally Note, Conditional Determination, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038 (1974).
117. 41 F.R1D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
118. Id. at 45.
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facts subsequently revealed that the class was unmanageable, the court
could then order the class allegations stricken." 9
A great many courts have followed the Kronenberg approach and
have made their certification orders conditional or reserved the power to
alter or amend at a later date. 2 ' The device has been used when the
resolution of the notice issue is pending, 2' when the class may have
been prejudiced by delay in moving for the determination,' 22 when the
number of potential plaintiffs may prove few enough to make joinder
practicable,' 2 and when there may be a need for the creation of sub-
classes.1 24 When a plaintiff has sustained the minimal burden of satis-
fying the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) in the adversary context
of the class hearing, it is considered the better practice to grant condi-
tional class action treatment, even though there is the possibility that
the class allegations will later have to be stricken. 125
Use of conditional orders has met with some opposition. 126 Because
class members may rely on an affirmative order, albeit tentative, Judge
Frankel has cautioned the courts against relying on their power to alter
or amend the (c)(1) order.' 27 His specific contention that the effect of
a subsequently amended order can operate to deprive potential plaintiffs
of their action if the statute of limitations has run 28 is satisfactorily met
by the Supreme Court's recent holding in American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah 29 that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable
119. One court has taken the opposite approach. It denied the class action with
the possibility of reinstatement after the individual class representative's action had
progressed further. See Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
This approach was rejected in Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 n.10 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
120. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57
F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Weisman v. MCA, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258 (D. Del. 1968);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
121. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
122. See, e.g., Feder v. Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
123. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff'd, 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972).
124. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1966), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
125. See City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 236 (E.D. Pa.
1970).
126. See, e.g., Class Determination, supra note 56, at 797-98.
127. See Frankel, supra note 32, at 42.
128. Id.
129. 414 U.S. 538 (1974). This holding effectively disposes of questions raised by
other commentators on the statute of limitations issue. See, e.g., Note, Class Actions
Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial Interpretation, 49 B.U.L. Ram. 682,
701 (1969).
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statute of limitations as to all members of the class. On the other hand,
the Court's holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin".. that individual
notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable
through reasonable effort, and that the cost of this notice must be borne
wholly by plaintiffs, raises grave implications with regard to tentative
determinations. Conceivably, a certified plaintiff class which had en-
gaged in the costly and time consuming process of issuing notice, might
subsequently be determined unmanageable as a class in whole or part.
The potential problems with tentative determinations indicate that
they should not be relied on indiscriminately. On balance, however, the
better approach seems to be that once plaintiff has satisfied the class
issues enumerated in Rule 23(a) and (b), the court should proceed
with its threshold determination on maintainability. 131 More often than
not, the court's initial determination will withstand the rigors of subse-
quent scrutiny. The availability of conditional or tentative orders can be
seen as a device for mitigating the potential difficulties with the early
determination mandated by Rule 23(c)(1). By making a conditional
order or using his power to alter or amend later, the trial judge thus
moves the action one step closer to trial and uses Rule 23 as the flexible,
pragmatic tool it was designed to be.
Guidelines for California
With judicial incorporation of Rule 23(c)(1) into California pro-
cedure,' 32 the bar now has the opportunity to make new law with regard
to the class determination. Presently, there is little discoverable case law
reporting directly on the issue of when maintenance of a class action is
to be determined. California's general class action statute, section 382 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, makes the class action device available
"when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to
bring them all before the court . . . ."I" It contains no specific provi-
sions, however, relating to the manner in which the class action is to be
conducted. In actions brought under this statute, the class issue tradition-
ally has been resolved by demurrer or summary judgment, the generally
applicable methods by which actions are dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.'
34
130. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
131. See City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 236 (E.D. Pa.
1970); Note, Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial Inter-
pretation, 49 B.U.L. REV. 682 (1969).
132. See text accompanying notes 13-16 infra.
133. CAL. CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 382 (West 1973).
134. See, e.g., Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 3d
193, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1974); Metowski v. Traid Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104
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In contrast, the provisions for bringing a class action under the
CLRA,13 5 designed to be supplementary to rather than exclusive of
other class action remedies, 36 are quite specific. Under section 1781,
any consumer who has been damaged by one of certain proscribed
business practices' 3 7 may, if the unlawful practice has caused damage to
other consumers similarly situated, bring a class action.' 38 The suit must
be maintained if the court finds that it is impracticable to bring all class
members before the court, the common questions of law or fact are
substantially similar and predominate over questions affecting individual
members, the representative claims or defenses are typical of those of the
class, and the representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.' 39 The court is further directed upon motion of
any party and notice to the other parties, to hold a hearing at which
three possible issues may be determined: whether the class is maintaina-
ble; if so, whether notice is necessary; finally, whether the action is
without merit or defense.
140
Notable in both statutes is the absence of any provision as to when
class maintainability is to be determined. With the California Supreme
Court's most recent directive in City of San Jose v. Superior Court,'4'
timing of the class determination is certain to be a litigated issue. The
construction the federal courts have given Rule 23(c)(1), coupled with
California's piecemeal incorporation of Rule 23 and the interpretations
which the California courts have offered, provides a good starting point
in its resolution. At this juncture a few recommendations may be
helpful.
First, there is persuasive authority to the effect that a determination
"as soon as practicable" contemplates an early determination as a
threshold issue.' 42 This position is in harmony with the drafters' intent,
and its adoption in California is suggested. One of the most helpful
contributions a court could make in this area would be the promulgation
of a local rule setting a specific time for the class determination. 43 The
Cal. Rptr. 599 (1972); Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 639 (1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
135. CAL. Cwv. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West 1970).
136. See id. § 1752.
137. See id. § 1770.
138. Id. § 1781(a).
139. Id. § 1781(b).
140. Id. § 1781(c). In Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699,
109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973), the court interpreted the provision requiring a determination
as to whether the action is without merit to mean that the court need only find that
evidence in support of the plaintiff's theory may be available at trial, and not that the
plaintiff will necessarily prevail. Id. at 707, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
141. 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974).
142. See text accompanying notes 46-51.
143. Los Angeles Superior Court has compiled a complete set of rules for the pre-
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availability of a specific rule would reduce litigation at the outset. One
local rule requires a motion for or against the class determination to be
made within sixty days after the pleadings are filed.' This period of
time would seem to allow sufficient opportunity for discovery on the
class issues while still moving the litigation along in an expeditious
manner.
Second, it is well established under federal law that the (c)(1)
determination is to rest on satisfaction of the requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b).148 The class action provisions in the CLRA make
maintenance conditional on the satisfaction of similar requirements.' 46
The classic test for resolving the class issue in California, 14 7 set forth in
Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,' 4' is in substantial agreement.
Third, the proper vehicle for resolving the maintainability issue is a
class action hearing.'49 This procedure is specifically provided for under
the CLRA,"10 and its appropriateness has been recognized in actions
brought under section 382 as well."' As noted earlier," 2 it has been
suggested that maintainability can be determined by the pleadings and
affidavits. While reliance on these documents helps assure an early
determination, it will be the rare case in which they will suffice to lay the
proper foundation for the court's determination. In the more usual
situation, the court should allow limited discovery on the class issues."53
Fourth, the court must take care to confine the hearing to the
particular class issues and not allow it to evolve into a pretrial on the
trial conduct of class actions. See CLASS ACTION MANUAL, supra note 34. The manual
has much to commend it. On the precise question of timing of the class determination,
however, it seems to fall short of meeting the federal rule's requirement of a determina-
tion as soon as practicable. See id. § 421.2.
144. See S.D.N.Y. Cirv. R. llA(c).
145. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 104.
146. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
147. See note 7 supra.
148. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
149. The Los Angeles court rules, for example, require an initial hearing in every
case and allow for subsequent hearings when necessary. See CLASS ACTION MANqUAL,
supra note 34, §§ 422.1, 423.1. As under federal law, the class determination in actions
brought under section 382 can be made on the motion of either the plaintiff, the defend-
ant, or the court. In contrast, the determination in actions brought under the CLRA
is made only on motion of one of the parties to the action. Compare City of San Jose
v. Superior Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 453, 525 P.2d 701, 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1974)
with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(c) (West 1973).
150. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
151. See, e.g., Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 3d
193, 198, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1974).
152. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
153. This procedure was followed by the trial court in City of San Jose, and ap-
proved by the supreme court. 12 Cal. 3d at 453, 525 P.2d at 705, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
801.
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merits."' Struggling with the necessity of keeping out speculative suits,
while acknowledging the need for an early determination that does not
look into the merits, courts have advanced various standards on which to
judge the ostensible class: that the complaint state a claim cognizable as
a class action; that it be sincere, more than frivolous; and that it contain
a genuine issue.'55 Use of such standards will help the court frame the
scope of the class hearing.
Fifth, courts should use conditional orders and avail themselves of
the opportunity to alter or amend a determination prior to a decision on
the merits. This device introduces an additional degree of flexibility to
class litigation, and its viability in both federal and California courts has
been firmly established. 15 6
As noted earlier,15 7 conditional orders have a potentially undesir-
able side effect in that a party may engage in costly notice and subse-
quently have his action stripped of its class characteristics. Section 1781
of the CLRA mitigates this problem somewhat by permitting publica-
tion to be substituted for personal notice if the latter would be unrea-
sonably expensive. 158 Whether this provision will stand in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen regarding the necessity of individual
notice is an open question.159
Sixth, the issue of whether the complaint states a cause of action
should be separated from the class issue and resolved through the
traditional channels of demurrer and summary judgment.6 0 Conversely,
the demurrer should not be used as the means of challenging the
propriety of the class. Section 1781 establishes a procedural device
which is unique to the resolution of the class issue and similar in
substance to Rule 23(c)(1).' 6 ' For actions brought outside the CLRA,
clarification of the proper means for testing the viability of the class may
lie with judicial innovation and promulgation of local rules. Such judi-
cial definition would further sharpen the focus of class litigation.
Finally, a reappraisal of California's general class action statute,
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is in order. That statute
provides little guidance for the conduct of class actions outside the scope
of the CLRA. A general class action statute with the kind of guidelines
154. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
155. See Note, A (c)(1) Hearing on Maintainability of a Class Action Suit Should
Not Determine Ultimate Merits of Individual Claim, 11 Housr. L. REV. 732, 743
(1974).
156. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
157. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
158. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(d) (West 1970).
159. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
160. See Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971); Guarantee Ins.
Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Il. 1972).
161. SeeCAL. Ci. CoDE § 1781(c) (West 1973).
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embodied in Rule 23 and section 1781 of the CLRA would be a helpful
addition to California procedure.
Conclusion
How California trial courts interpret the "as soon as practicable"
language of Rule 23(c)(1), incorporated into California procedure by
City of San Jose v. Superior Court,6 2 will be a question of great
significance in the next few years. Protection of substantial interests is at
stake. To a defendant, a determination made too early can result in huge
settlement costs; to a plaintiff, a prolonged determination can effectively
foreclose his action.
Conceivably, California trial courts will grapple with many of the
problems encountered by the federal courts in their evolving construc-
tion of Rule 23(c)(1). Nevertheless, the substantial body of federal
cases which have construed the meaning of determining maintainability
as soon as practicable can provide valuable assistance in the resolution
of the maintainability issue in California.
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